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PROPOSALS CONCERNING A LEGAL SYSTEM
FOR OCEANOGRAPHIC STATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently there has developed a renewed interest in the economic
and military potential of the oceans; and as a result, the demand for
oceanographic research has greatly increased.'
To facilitate the research, specially designed marine structures
called "ocean buoys" or "stations" are being developed. Unlike con-
temporary vessels,2 the stations are constructed so that they are able
to remain at a fixed location for an indefinite period of time,3 permitting
accurate, long-term studies to be conducted.
The buoys are of two basic types. The first is an "unmanned
ocean buoy,"4 which will be equipped with automatic recording devices
and transmitters. Data collected by this buoy will be broadcast to relay
satellites or to shore based receivers.5
The second type is a "manned ocean buoy."' Designed to carry
both men and equipment, this type may be permanently fixed on or
below the ocean surface in one specific location, or it may be a free-
floating, surface type.'
II. PROBLEMS ARISING FRoM THE USE OF OCEAN RESEARCH Buoys
A multitude of problems arise when a state or private organization
places an oceanographic station in the sea. Because sites chosen by
oceanographers for the location of the ocean stations may coincide with
those chosen for oil, mineral, cable and fishing operations, conflicts
may arise as to the right to occupy certain areas of the oceans.' Of
equal, if not greater importance, is the conflict which may develop
1 National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, Oceanography 1960-
70, ch. 7, at 11 (1999).
2 Id., ch. 7, at 11.
3 Ibid.
4 National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, op. cit. supra note 1,
at 10.
5 Interagency Committee on Oceanography of the Federal Council for Science and
Technology for the U.S.A, Oceanography: The Ten Years Ahead, A Long Range
Oceanographic Plan 1963-1972, 33 (1963).
O National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, op. cit. supra note
3 at 12.
7 Id. at 12.
8 UNESCO, Intergovernmental Oceanographic Comm'n, Preliminary Report of the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the International
Maritime Consultative Organization on the Legal Status of Unmanned and Manned
Fixed Oceanographic Stations, 10 (NS/IOC/INF/34) (1962).
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between research and shipping interests As indicated above, some
of these stations are very large, and could cause extensive damage to
small vessels should a collision occur.10 On the other hand, the cost
of the stations is considerable, and the information gathered from them
invaluable, so it is equally important that the station itself be pro-
tected." Surface buoys must be protected from collision, theft, and
malicious destruction. Sub-surface stations must be protected from
damage caused by anchors and fish nets which may snag the structure.
At the same time, the right of vessels to fish and drop anchor where
they choose should not be unduly infringed.'
Inevitably, one of these problems will create a dispute, and rights
and liabilities of the parties will have to be determined. Consequently
it is imperative that an international legal system capable of resolving
these controversies be devised.13
One of the first steps to be taken in the formulation of a system
of law sufficient to govern controversies centering around ocean buoys
is to determine the nature or character of the station. If the buoys can
be fitted into existing maritime definitional concepts, it may be possible
to extend present international and domestic maritime law to resolve
controversies. If it is not possible, it still may be necessary to categorize
the buoys for the purposes of a convention conceived specifically to
regulate ocean station relationships.14 For example, a conventional ves-
sel must maintain lighting and lookouts according to the provisions of
the International Regulations; similarly, if the buoy is considered to
be an "aid to navigation" or "an extension of land," local or inter-
national rules may again be dispositive of the issue of negligence.
However, if it is determined that the ocean stations fit none of these
definitions, or that conventional maritime law should not be used but
a new system employed, it still may be desirable to devise an interna-
tional, uniform scheme of marking and lighting the stations,"3 and to
mark and light the stations according to classes of stations. 6
Characterization is also important if a question of salvage arises,
9 UNESCO, Intergovernmental Oceanographic Comm'n, Report on the Second Ses-
sion of the Commission, Annex V at 39, (NS/10) (1962); McDougal & Burke, The
Public Order of the Oceans, 691-2 (1962).
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 UNESCO, Intergovernmental Oceanographic Comm'n, Final Report of the Third
Session, Annex XI-A, 79-80 (NS/191) (1964).
13 Interagency Committee on Oceanography, op. cit. supra note S at 34.
14 UNESCO, op. cit. sra note 12, Annex XI-A, at 79-80.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
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and conventional law is employed. Many marine objects are not subject
to salvage law. Under conventional law the mere fact that it floats does
not necessarily make the object amenable to salvage."7
The stations themselves, as well as the instruments housed within
it, are very expensive; and the information recorded by the equipment
invaluable.' Consequently, it is important that this property be pro-
tected from theft and malicious destruction. The question is by what
system of law will they be protected. If the law of piracy is found to
be adequate, should it apply to structures such as buoys? Or perhaps
the criminal code of one or several of the states would be more accept-
able. This is one of the more pressing problems to be solved by an
international convention.
There is also a question of which state or organization has, or
should be given, the right to adjudicate claims arising from the use of
the oceanographic stations. At present, states have asserted broad juris-
diction to adjudicate maritime controversies, but it still remains to be
decided whether oceanographic stations fall within the present juris-
dictional schemes.' 9 In addition, irrespective of whether it is possible
for states to assert jurisdiction, a decision will have to be made as to
whether conventional jurisdictional systems will afford the greatest
protection to the stations, as well as maximum ease and economy in
adjudicating claims.
This is by no means an exhaustive list of all the problems con-
nected with the use of ocean stations. Only the more important, more
pressing problems have been set forth. Recognizing the serious and
intricate nature of these problems, the Intergovernmental Oceano-
graphic Commission (IOC) has set about to draft an international
convention which hopefully will not only present a solution to these
problems but which will also be acceptable to all the states involved.20
Consequently, in 1962 the Commission requested that all members
contribute material which may serve as a basis for the convention.
The members were asked to submit to UNESCO a report:
(a) on their domestic laws, regulations, orders, court and ad-
ministrative decisions, diplomatic correspondence and any other
legal authority concerning such fixed oceanographic stations;
(b) on their regulations and practices concerning the marking and
identification of fixed oceanographic stations;
(c) on what legal problems, if any, they would wish considered in a
new international convention concerning fixed oceanographic sta-
'7 Cope v. Vallette Dry Dock Co., 119 U.S. 625, 627 (1887).
18 See note 5 supra.
19 UNESCO, op. cit. supra note 8, at 19.
20 UNESCO, op. cit. supra note 9, Annex I, Resolution 18.
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tions, together with the possible solutions that might be adopted in
an international convention.21
As of June, 1964, only five member states had responded to this
request.2 2 The remainder of this comment will discuss existing maritime
statutes and case-law of the United States and United Kingdom which
may be pertinent to the solution of the problems enumerated above.
III. GENERAL AND SPECIFIC POLICIES GOVERNING THE CHOICE
OF A LEGAL SYSTEM
The general policy, which should underlie the formulation of a
substantive and jurisdictional system of law capable of resolving dis-
putes relating to oceanographic stations, is to preserve for all persons
the maximum use of the oceans. All persons should be able to engage in
any activity desired with only the minimum restraints necessary to
prevent conflicts.23 Such a policy is both desirable and possible since
the ocean is such a large and empty area that many activities can be
carried on simultaneously, and through cooperation, can be conducted
with a minimum of physical interference from other parties.2
Interference with the freedom of the seas is justifiable only when
the interference will produce proportionately greater benefits for man. 5
Since ocean research will benefit all ocean interests greatly, increased
interference with other marine activities is justified in order to protect
marine operations.2 6 Therefore, the specific policy is to protect ocean
research equipment and operations, even if this protection will mean
that the remaining marine interests will be forced to yield some of their
freedom of use of the sea.
IV. DEFINITIONAL STATUS OF MANNED AND UNMANNED
OCEANOGRAPHIC STATIONS
If certain portions of conventional maritime law are prescribed as
the controlling law for the resolution of collision, theft, and salvage
disputes involving oceanographic stations, it will be necessary to deter-
21 Ibid.
22 UNESCO, Intergovernmental Oceanographic Comm'n, Report of the Director-
General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization in Con-
sultation with the Secretary-General of the Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative
Organization on the legal Status of Oceanographic Research Stations, 278 (UNESCO/
IOC! in F-60 (1964). The states responding were: Argentina, Canada, Denmark, Philip-
pines, and US.S.R. A list of 37 international conventions were also submitted for con-
sideration. See generally id. at 279-282.
23 McDougal & Burke, op. cit. supra note 9, at 751.
24 Id. at 748-49.
25 Id. at 748.
26 Id. at 752.
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mine whether the stations fall within certain classes of objects pro-
tected by existing law. In the past, it has been imperative that the
object be embraced by one of the classes set out below in order to deter-
mine which set of rules will be applicable. Nevertheless, certain portions
of existing maritime law may be selected as a basis for a convention
notwithstanding the fact that the stations do not fit into any of the
existing definitional classes in order that the protection provided by
a certain set of rules may be prescribed for the stations.
A. Vessel
It has been suggested that the large, manned oceanographic sta-
tions be called "vessels" for the purpose of extending the rules for
marking and lighting conventional vessels to the stations. Such a
characterization might also be useful for the purpose of invoking
the conventional legal systems dealing with collision, destruction, and
theft.
In the past, maritime law has limited its protection to objects
which possess certain physical characteristics. Under the universal law
of the sea, the term "vessel" is applied only to objects which have two
distinctive characteristics: first, they must be floating structures, and
second, they must be capable of transporting something over the
water." Similar requirements are imposed by maritime statutes. Typ-
ical is section 3 of Title 1 of the United States Code which defines the
word "vessel" as "every description of watercraft or other artificial
contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transporta-
tion on water." The purpose of requiring the object to possess certain
distinctive characteristics was to limit the protection of the system to
certain prescribed objects.
Yet when the purpose of denominating an object as a vessel
changes, the physical requirements are greatly modified if not over-
looked altogether. If, for example, the purpose of denominating an
object as a "vessel" is to allow an injured person to avail himself of the
remedies for seamen provided by the Jones Act,29 physical require-
ments are overlooked and the term "vessel" is liberally construed.30 The
controversy in Guilbeau v. Falcon Seaboard Drilling Co. 1 centered
around an oilworker who was injured while working on a submersible
drilling rig. The court acknowledged the traditional definition of a
27 UNESCO, op. cit. supra note 12, Annex XI-A, at 79.
28 Gilmore & Black, The Law of Admiralty, 30 (1957).
29 1 Stat. 255 (1792), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
20 Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 1312 (1961).
31 215 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. La. 1963).
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Cvessel," yet nevertheless held that, for the purpose of allowing a
suit under the Jones Act, a submersible drilling rig, which neither floats
nor transports, is a "vessel."
However, it (a vessel) may also mean something more than a means
of transportation on water. It can be a special purpose craft, an
unconventional vessel not usually employed as a means of transport-
ing by water but designed for occupations offshore and in the
shallow coastal waters of the Gulf of Mexico .... The submersible
drilling rig here is such a special purpose craft and there can be
little question that the drilling barge known as Rig No. 4 is a
vessel.3 2
Thus, for the purpose of extending Jones Act protection, few, if any
physical limits are put on the term "vessel."
Similarly, for the purpose of prescribing certain portions of exist-
ing maritime law as controlling in cases centering around oceanographic
buoys, the term vessel might be defined as including "any oceano-
graphic research device which is located in navigable waters."
B. Aid to Navigation
An "aid to navigation" is defined by United States Federal Regula-
tions as any device external to a vessel or aircraft intended to assist a
navigator to determine his position or safe course, or to warn him of
dangers or obstructions to navigation." However, only a small amount
of the equipment contained aboard the research stations is intended
to function as an aid to navigation.34 The stations mark no chan-
nels, do not indicate hidden navigational dangers, and, except in the
case of stations equipped with radio transmitters which emit signals
to aid in submarine navigation, they indicate no particular location on
the seas. 5 Because of their extreme importance to shipping, laws have
been passed to give aids to navigation an extraordinary measure of
protection from collision, theft, and intentional damage, protection not
accorded vessels or ordinary marine objects.36 Consequently, even
though the stations may not be designed or function as a conventional
aid to navigation, it may be desirable .to denominate these stations as
aids to navigation in order to provide them with greater protection
against collision, theft, and malicious destruction.
32 Id. at 910.
33 33 C.F.R. § 60.01-5(a) (1962).
34 UNESCO, op. cit. supra note 8, at 3.
35 Ibid.
36 E.g., Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, 57 & 58 Vict., c. 60 s. 666, 684; Malicious
Damage Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., c. 97, s. 48; 33 U.S.C. §§ 408, 411, 412 (1964); 46
U.S.C. § 1333 (1964); Aids to Navigation Protection Regulations, SOR/64-323, 98 Can.
Gaz. 823 (1964).
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C. Marine Objects
Under conventional maritime law, many claims arise concerning
objects which fail to meet the physical tests of either a vessel or an aid
to navigation. Nevertheless, admiralty courts will adjudicate claims
involving "marine objects" if (1) they are found in, and (2) the cause
of action arises in, navigable waters.3 7 If both conditions are fulfilled,
courts of the United States 38 and the United Kingdom"9 will apply the
entire body of maritime law to the problem. If the sole purpose of a
convention were to extend existing maritime law to the stations, all of
the stations could meet the physical requirements of this category.
However, the purpose of classifying the stations is not merely to find
some law which will be applicable, but rather to prescribe law which
will afford the stations equal, or greater protection than that enjoyed
by other interests. Consequently, the stations should not be classified as
"marine objects," for such a classification will not create as great a
protection as might be gained by classifying the stations as vessels or
aids to navigation.
If the purpose for classifying were merely to extend existing law
to the stations, problems would arise in meeting the physical require-
ments of each of the above definitional classes. But this is not the pur-
pose. The purpose for classifying the stations is to examine and then
select a system of law which will most adequately carry out the policy
of giving the stations as much protection as possible. This purpose
should be borne in mind when examining existing substantive and
jurisdictional maritime law.
V. SUBSTANTIVE LAW
There is a great deal of substantive law which could advan-
tageously be embodied in a convention for the purpose of determining
collision, theft, and salvage claims involving oceanographic stations. 40
-Much of the law set out below could be adopted as a basis for the sub-
stantive portion of the convention with little or no modification. How-
ever, the law concerning maritime disputes, especially disputes in-
volving intentional and accidental damage to marine property, is
"extremely complicated and varies in its application from place to
place."4 Consequently, it would be confusing, if not hazardous, to
allow operators of vessels and oceanographic stations to proceed with-
37 The M. R. Brazos, 17 Fed. Cas. 951 (No. 9,893) (S.D.N.Y. 1879).
38 McWilliams Dredging Co. v. United States, 105 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. La. 1952).
39 The Clara Killam, L.R. 3 Adm. & EccI. 161 (1870).
40 UNESCO, op. cit. supra note 22, at 278-32.
41 UNESCO, op. cit. supra note 8, at 16.
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out a definite and clear statement of their respective rights and
liabilities. Therefore, the law should be clarified through the adoption of
an international convention. This portion of this comment will examine
the pertinent case-law and statutes of the United States and the United
Kingdom with a view toward recommending a portion of the existing
law to be used as the substantive basis of a convention.
A. Collision
English and United States maritime case-law has adequately pro-
vided for the determination of liability in cases of collision between a
vessel and a marine object. The substantive maritime law of these two
States is almost identical, due to the fact that the United States very
early in its history adopted English maritime law,42 and the subsequent
development of the law in these two States has been, for the most part,
parallel.43 Further, Great Britain for centuries dominated the world's
shipping,44 resulting in wide application of the system with apparent
success. For these reasons, it is likely that an examination of this sys-
tem will yield law which will adequately protect the stations in cases
involving collision with vessels.
The attitude of the English courts towards damage done by a
vessel to a "marine object" is well-stated in The Clara Killam.4 5 In that
case, a ship dropped anchor in the English Channel, and the anchor
snagged a submarine telegraph cable. The captain of the ship ordered
the cable cut in order to free the anchor; the cable company libeled for
the damages sustained by the cable. Sir Robert Phillimore, in holding
for the cable company, stated:
I must consider that this telegraph cable was lawfully placed at
the bottom of the sea. I must also consider that the vessel which
did the injury to it was in the exercise of her right, both in navi-
gating the surface of the sea and in dropping her anchors when and
where she did. The law requires that each party should exercise his
right so as, if possible, to avoid a conflict with the right of the other.
It was the duty, therefore, of the ship, if possible, to disentangle
her anchor from the cable without injuring it.4 6
The opinion sets out clearly the general rule of liability for colli-
sion: one, who through his negligent use of the seas, injures another,
is liable in damages." A vessel which negligently injures a marine
42 De Lovio v. Bolt, 7 Fed. Cas. 418 (No. 3,776) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815).
43 The Diana, 539 Lush. 243, 167 Eng. Rep. 243, 244 (Adm. 1862).
44 McDougal and Burke, op. cit. supra note 9, at 823.
45 L.R. 3 Adm. & Eccl. 161 (1870).
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.; accord International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules to
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object, must pay damages; conversely, a marine object which is the
source of injury to a vessel may be successfully libelled. The determina-
tion of liability will turn upon two issues: the right of the vessel and
marine object to conduct operations at a particular point in the seas,
and the compliance of the vessel and marine object with national or
international navigation and lighting rules which are applicable in the
particular case.48
United States courts adhere to an identical rule. The Clara49 points
out that the party at fault must bear all of his own losses and com-
pensate the other party for his damages. If neither party is found to
be at fault, then each must bear his own loss. But if both parties are
found to be at fault, the damages will be divided. This rule has been
extended to cover marine objects, such as buoys and beacons.50 Vessels
must maintain ordinary care in navigation to avoid collision; and the
ship is negligent if it maintains a standard of less than ordinary care
toward marine objects.51 As in England, it is also important whether the
vessel or marine object had a right to be where it was at the time of the
collision, and whether or not it was adequately marked, lighted, and
navigated.
While this law appears to be adequate, states have deemed it
necessary to enact specific legislation for the protection of aids to
navigation. One reason is that the damage to the ship is slight in a
collision with a buoy, but is extensive to the marine object. Further,
the buoys are for the most part unmanned, and the offending ship may
leave the scene of the collision without making good the damages.
Lastly, beacons and the like are so important to navigational safety that
the states wished to provide a strong deterrent to prevent their damage.
As a result, statutes now contain the bulk of the substantive law con-
cerning damage to marine objects, such as buoys, wharves, and the like.
In the United Kingdom, provisions of the Merchant Shipping
Act 2 determine rights and liabilities of parties involved in collision
with aids to navigation. That act provides in part:
Govern the Liability of Vessels When Collisions Occur Between Them, and a Protocol
Thereto, Benedict, Admiralty 37-42 (Knauth 7th ed. 1958).
48 International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1094
(1964).
49 102 US. 200, 203 (1880).
GO The C. W. Mills, 241 Fed. 204 (S.D. Ala. 1915); aff'd., 241 Fed. 378 (5th Cir.
1917).
51 Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, 57 & 58 Vict., c. 60, s. 666; Placid Oil Co. v. S.S.
Willowpool, 214 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Texas, 1963).
2 Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, 57 & 58 Vict., c. 60. s. 666.
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Offences in connexion with Lighthouse, & c.
(1) A person shall not willfully or negligently-
(a) injure ... any buoy or beacon;
(b) remove, alter, or destroy any... buoy, or beacon; or
(c) ride by, make fast to, or run foul of any lightship or buoy.
(2) If any person acts in contravention of this section, he shall, in
addition to the expenses of making good any damage so
occasioned, be liable to each offence to a fine not exceeding
fifty pounds.53
This act not only makes certain that any damage done to an aid
to navigation be made good by the negligent party, as does maritime
case law, but it also provides the additional deterrent of a fine. In
determining whether this statute is adequate as a basis for an inter-
national convention, it must be decided whether the statute will provide
adequate protection for the stations. In order to carry out the policy of
giving greater protection to the stations than to other maritime inter-
ests, it would be advantageous not only to require that compensation
be made for the damage done to the station, but also to insure protec-
tion through an additional deterrent such as a fine. The Merchant
Shipping Act might well serve as a basis for convention.
To invoke this, the term "buoy" could be broadly defined to in-
clude stations of all types. This, combined with a uniform system of
marking and lighting5 4 to warn other maritime interests of the presence
of the stations, and in some cases, to determine negligence, would pro-
vide adequate protection for the stations.
Canada has supplemented its maritime case-law with regulations
to protect aids to navigation.5 5 These regulations do not, however,
provide for assessment of damages against the negligent party. They
do provide fines for (1) failure to report the damage, and (2) for
committing the act which caused the damage. The Aids to Navigation
Protection Regulations state:
2. "[A] id to navigation" means a buoy, beacon ... or any other
structure ... maintained for the purpose of assisting the navigation
of vessels.
3. (1) The person in charge of any vessel or tow that, through
accident or unavoidable circumstances, runs down, moves, injures
or destroys an aid to navigation shall report the fact to the nearest
District Marine Agent....
(2) [Anyone required] who fails to report as soon as practi-
cable by the means prescribed in sub section (1) is guilty of an
offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding
fifty dollars.
63 Ibid.
54 UNESCO, op. cit. supra note 12, Annex XI-A, at 79 provides a suggested system
of marking and lighting of the oceanographic stations.
55 Aids to Navigation Protection Regulations, SOR/64-323, 98 Can. Gaz. 823 (1964).
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4. Every person who willfully or negligently injures, conceals, re-
moves, alters or destroys an aid to navigation or permits any
vessel or tow under his control to run foul of or to be made fast to
any aid to navigation is guilty of an offence and is liable on sum-
mary conviction to a fine not exceeding two hundred dollars.56
Since many of the ocean stations will be unmanned, it is necessary
that some means be adopted for compelling negligent or non-negligent
vessels to report the collision to the owner of the station, to the "flag
state" of the station, or to an international agency with facilities to
accomodate such reports. The international convention should cover
this problem. The Regulations above suggest one approach. Since the
Regulations are directed exclusively toward aids to navigation, the
question of their applicability to ocean stations arises. This problem
could be solved by a minor alteration of the text like that suggested
for the English Merchant Shipping Act.
The Regulations also provide for an all-inclusive fine for injuring
the buoys, apparently without regard to fault. It might be argued that
liability without fault would instill in navigators a higher degree of
caution toward the stations. On the other hand, mariners who know
that they will be punished summarily without the benefit of a deter-
mination of negligence may be less prone to report the collision. An
injured station might then flounder in the sea incurring greater damage
from the elements than the amount of the fine could repair.
The United States has enacted provisions which seem to include
the best of both the English statute and the Canadian Regulations.
Further, the provisions were clearly intended to cover research devices.
Section 408 of Title 33 of the United States Codes states:
It shall not be lawful for any person or persons to take possession
of or make use of for any purpose, or build upon, alter, deface,
destroy, move, injure, obstruct by fastening vessels thereto or other-
wise, or in any manner whatever impair the usefulness of any sea
wall, bulkhead, jetty, dike, levee, wharf, pier, or other work built
by the United States, or any piece of plant, floating or otherwise,
used in construction of such work under the control of the United
States, in whole or in part, for the preservation and improvement
of any of its navigable waters or to prevent floods, or as boundary
marks, tide gauges, surveying stations, buoys, or other established
marks .... 67
Section 408 is broad enough to protect all of the oceanographic
stations in question. The statute does not limit itself to aids to naviga-
tion, for it includes, inter alia, "tide guages" and "surveying stations"
U Ibid.
57 30 Stat. 1152 (1899), 33 U.S.C. § 408 (1964).
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and may include all types of oceanographic stations, without distorting
the usual meaning of those terms as was necessary under the English
Act." Further, recent cases have indicated that this section is to be
liberally construed in order to extend protection to the greatest number
of devices.3 9
Section 4111° provides in personam liability for violating Section
408, similar to Section 666 (2) of the English Merchant Shipping Act,61
and section 4 of the Canadian Regulations. 2 This quasi-criminal
statute allows fines in the amount of not less than 500 dollars, and not
more than 2,500 dollars, 3 and provides, in the case of natural persons,
for prison sentences of not less than thirty days nor more than one
year.64 These penalties, unlike those in the Canadian Regulations, can
serve as effective deterrents because they can be adjusted to the serious-
ness of the damage to the stations and the hindrance to the collection of
valuable information.
The conventional, maritime in rem remedy of the injured party is
set forth in section 412:63
And any boat, vessel, scow, raft, or other craft used in or em-
ployed in violating any of the provisions of sections ... 408 ...
shall be liable for the pecuniary penalties specified in section 411 of
this title, and in addition thereto for the amount of the damages
done by said boat, vessel, scow, raft, or other craft, which latter
sum shall be placed to the credit of the appropriation for the im-
provement of the harbor or waterway in which the damage occurred,
and said boat, vessel, scow, raft, or other craft may be proceeded
against summarily by way of libel in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction thereof. 66
While section 412 contains the traditional maritime in rem remedy,
it modifies that law to the extent that it is no longer necessary to prove
negligence on the part of the offending vessel. United States v. M/V
58 Supra note 51.
59 United States v. The S.S. American Hunter, 192 F. Supp. 447 (S.DN.Y. 1961).
Although this section is included under a heading which addresses itself to the Army
Corp of Engineering, the court held that the protection of section 408 is to be extended
to buoys operated by all departments of government. Upon rehearing (199 F. Supp. 531,
S.D.N.Y. 1961), the court went further, stating that section 408 applies to all buoys,
whether they be aids to navigation or not.
60 30 Stat. 1153 (1899), 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1964).
61 See note 51, supra.
62 See note 55, supra.
63 30 Stat. 1153 (1899), 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1964).
64 Ibid.
65 30 Stat. 1153 (1899), 33 U.S.C. § 412 (1964).
16 Ibid.
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Vitanic"7 involved a ship which collided with a beacon in a harbor. The
beacon consisted of a blinking light mounted on a three-pier structure.
The court held that the M/V Vitanic, regardless of negligence, was
liable for the damage done to the structure and for pecuniary fine pro-
vided by sections 408, 411, and 41268 merely because it was the instru-
ment which caused the damage.68 While the wisdom of such a holding
will not be discussed here, it must be conceded that such a measure
would provide strong deterrent protection for the stations.
Due to the strong protection, the ease of proof, and the absence
of definitional problems, sections 408, 411, and 412 of Title 33 would
provide a suitable framework for vessel liability under the interna-
tional convention.
The focus of the foregoing discussion has been on the liability of
the vessel, and indeed the one serious drawback to each of the groups
of legislation set out above is that there is no provision for the liability
of oceanographic stations if they are found to be the source of injury
to vessels. At least three solutions to this problem exist: (1) include in
the convention the traditional maritime negligence rules providing for
the liability of marine objects which are the source of damage to the
vessels; (2) extend the liability provision of sections 408, 411, and
412 to the oceanographic stations; or (3) include section 1333 of Title
43, United States Code, in the convention.
The first suggestion is objectionable for the same reason that
maritime case law is objectionable for determining vessel liability. The
case law is complicated and obscure in many areas, 7° and cannot be
restated with any real degree of precision and accuracy. It would be
more advantageous to employ the clean, precise language of one or
both of the statutes mentioned in (2) and (3) above.71
Sections 408, 411, and 412 might be employed to protect the
vessels. The main problem here is that these sections hold the vessel
67 1958 A.M.C. 998 (W.D. Wash.).
68 30 Stat. 1152-53 (1899), 33 U.S.C. §§ 40S, 411, 412 (1964).
69 Supra note 67, at 1002.
70 As an example of the complications which arise, see Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345
U.S. 571 (1953). In determining what law to apply to the claim of an injured seaman,
the court found it necessary to consider: (1) the situs of the wrongful act; (2) the law
of the flag of the ship; (3) the allegiance or domicile of the injured; (4) the allegiance
of the defendant; and (5) the place of the contract of employment. Many of these
problems will be avoided by use of an international convention which will have universal,
uniform application.
71 Note, however, the maritime case-law provides an in rem remedy against negli-
gently maintained marine objects. McWilliams Dredging Co. v. United States, 105 F. Supp.
582, 538 (E.D. La. 1952).
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summarily liable without a finding as to negligence.72 Therefore, the
cause would be adjudicated without ever determining whether the
station was properly marked or lighted. One solution might be to strike
the provisions calling for a summary determination of liability, and
substitute provisions for a finding on the issue of negligence. It would
also be necessary to alter the text of the statute so that it would include
not only damage done by a vessel, but also damage done to a vessel.
The penal provisions would then be applicable to the owners of ocean
stations and would deter careless placement of the stations and negli-
gent maintenance of the buoy warning system. This method, however,
involves major revision of sections 408, 411, and 412.
The third solution is to invoke section 1333 (e) (2) of title 43.
This section provides that inadequately marked stations may be
marked by the Coast Guard or any governmental body having jurisdic-
tion over the waters in which the stations are placed, and allows the
owners of the offending station to be fined up to 100 dollars per day for
each day the station remains inadequately marked."3 Such a provision
is necessary because poorly marked stations are a continuous source of
danger to all ships which pass through the area. The section would be
preventative rather than remedial, however, because the use of ade-
quate markings will avoid collisions, and thus lessen the necessity to
invoke the liability-determining sections of the convention. It is pos-
sible to make this statute consistent with sections 408, 411, and 412, in
three ways: (1) use the fines as a set-off against the amount of the
award due from the vessel; (2) provide that the fines be paid to the
body which has jurisdiction over the stations; or (3) have a determina-
tion of negligence for both the vessel and the station. If the station is
found negligent, it will pay the fine specified in section 1333 (e) (2) in
addition to the damage to the ship.74
The final proposal is that sections 408, 411 and 412 of Title 33,
and section 1333 (e) (2) of Title 43 be combined, as modified above, to
form a firm basis for an international convention. The result would be
as follows:
72 See note 67, supra.
73 67 Stat. 462 (1953), 43 U.S.C. § 1333, (e) (2) (1964).
74 The reader's attention is invited to 14 U.S.C. §§ 81, 83, 84, 90, and 94 (1964),
Coast Guard provisions concerning buoys and oceanographic research; 33 CF.R.
§§ 66.01-1-67.0-45 (1962), concerning the marking of private aids to navigation on
the Continental Shelf; 33 C.F.R. §§ 140.01-1 to 140.10-45 (1962), and §§ 140.20-1 to
140-20-5 (1962), concerning the marking and lighting of artificial islands and fixed struc-
tures located on the Continental Shelf (penalty set out there is that of 43 U.S.C. § 1333
(1964)); and 33 C.F.R. § 146.05-35 (1962), concerning the safety equipment required
for manned platforms.
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(1) when the vessel is found to be negligent, there would be:
(a) an in rem remedy for damages (sections 408 and 412, as
modified); and
(b) a quasi-criminal provision for fines and prison sentences
(section 411).
(2) when the station is found to be negligent, there would be:
(a) an in rem remedy for damages (sections 408 and 412, as
modified);
(b) a penalty for negligent maintenance of the stations (sec-
tion 1333(e) (2).
The result would be a clear and concise statement of rights and
liabilities of both vessels and stations in the event of a collision, as well
as greater protection for the stations than is afforded vessels and other
marine objects.
B. Intentional Damage and Theft
Problems arising under this heading will be unilateral. The inten-
tional damage or theft will be committed against the stations, and not
the converse. Unmanned stations obviously cannot commit a malicious
act against a vessel, and the manned stations are not sufficiently mobile
to ply the seas for these purposes. The very fact that the stations are
small in relation to the vessels, and, for the most part unmanned, makes
them and their equipment extremely susceptible to acts of intentional
damage and theft.
A number of statutes have made provision for intentional damage
to buoys. England's Merchant Shipping Act,75 discussed above, ex-
plicitly provides remedies for willful injury of an aid to navigation.
However, an earlier statute, the Malicious Damage Act of 1861, 7" deals
with the problem more forcefully than does the Merchant Shipping Act.
Section 48 of the Malicious Damage Act reads:
Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously cut away, cast
adrift, remove, alter, deface, sink, or destroy, or shall unlawfully and
maliciously do any Act with Intent to cut away, cast adrift, remove,
alter, deface, sink, or destroy, or shall in any other manner unlaw-
fully and maliciously injure or conceal any Boat, Buoy, Buoy Rope,
Perch, or Mark used or intended for the Guidance of Seamen, or for
the Purpose of Navigation, shall be guilty of Felony, and being
convicted thereof shall be liable at the Discretion of the Court, to
be kept in Penal Servitude for any Term not exceeding Seven
Years....
This portion of the Malicious Damage Act provides protection for
aids to navigation from all types of malicious destruction, and few acts
75 1894, 57 & 58 Vict., c. 60 § 666.
76 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., c. 97, § 48.
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are able to escape its application. A minor objection is that it applies
only to aids to navigation, and was never intended to apply to structures
such as ocean stations.
Title 33 of the United States Code presents no such definitional
problems. As shown above,77 section 408,78 applies explicitly to research
devices as well as aids to navigation. It includes malicious destruction
as well as inadvertent damage. Section 411, which contains quasi-
criminal provisions for fines and prison terms, does not distinguish
between willful and negligent damage. Section 412, in addition to pro-
viding an in rem remedy against the offending vessel, is the first of the
series of sections cited which draws a distinction between willful and
negligent acts. However, this portion of section 412 applies only to a
"... master, pilot, and engineer, or person or persons acting in such
capacity .... One who is found to have willfully injured a research
device is liable, in addition to the fines and sentences of section 411, to
a suspension or revocation of his license.8" Except for the persons
enumerated, no greater penalty is made for willful damage than for
negligent injury.
Two solutions are available: (1) use a strict criminal statute such
as the Malicious Damage Act to impose greater penalties on those who
willfully destroy or damage the ocean stations; or (2) use sections 408,
411, and 412 to make negligent damage of the stations an equally grave
offense as willful damage. The choice depends upon whether it is
more desirable to provide reparations for damage to the stations not-
withstanding how the damage was occasioned, or whether it is more
desirable to provide reparation for damage to the stations, but still
retain the distinction between intentional and negligent acts. The first
alternative will avoid proof of intent and will afford greater protection
of the stations than a negligence-orientated system.
Theft can and must be distinguished from both negligent and
intentional damage. The Preliminary Report of the IOC1 suggests that
Article 15 of the Convention of the High Seas will protect the stations
from theft. The Convention appears to restate the basic concepts of
piracy, and extend these concepts to aircraft as well as to vessels. The
definitions of piracy in Article 15 of the Convention8" (acts of violence,
detention, and depredation), in English cases, such as Re Piracy Jure
7 See United States v. The S.S. American Hunter, supra note 59.
78 30 Stat. 1152 (1899), 33 U.S.C. § 408 (1964).
79 30 Stat. 1153 (1899), 33 U.S.C. § 412 (1964).-
80 Ibid.
81 UNESCO, op. cit. supra, not6 8, at 15-16.
82 Convention on the High Seas, Article 15.
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Gentium83 (robbery and depredation), and in United States cases, such
as United States v. Smith 4 (robbery and forcible depredations), all
suggest that piracy is something more than mere theft. The Smith case
states that: piracy is only a sea term for robbery, piracy being a rob-
ery committed within the jurisdiction of the admiralty. 5
It appears that piracy is premised upon the existence of a manned
structure which offers resistance to the piratical acts, that inherent in
the act of piracy is a threat to the well-being or life. Three points sup-
port this conclusion: (1) robbery, the synonym of the term piracy,
means the felonious taking of another's property from his person or in
his presence,"6 theft, however, merely means the taking of another's
property without his consent, 7 (2) punishment for piracy indicates
something far more grevious than mere theft;"8 and (3) a careful
search has revealed no case where taking of property not aboard a
manned vessel was held to be piracy.
Since many of the oceanographic stations are unmanned, protection
through the law of piracy is doubtful. Consequently, prescribing the
law of piracy would give little protection to the stations.
Both England and the United States have enacted statutes dealing
with maritime theft. England has contributed the Larceny Act.89
Section 15 of that Act reads as follows:
Every person who steals-(1) any goods in any vessel, barge or boat or any description in
any haven or any port of entry or discharge or upon any
navigable river or canal or in any creek or basin belonging to
or communicating with any such haven, port, river, or canal; or
(3) any part of any vessel in distress, wrecked, stranded, or cast on
shore, or any goods, merchandise, or articles of any kind
belonging to such vessel;
shall be guilty of felony and on conviction thereof liable to penal
servitude for any term not exceeding fourteen years. 0
Two modifications of this statute will be necessary before it will be
of any value to the drafters of the international convention. First, the
83 [19343 A.C. 586 (H.K.).
84 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820).
85 Id. at 161.
8o Deal v. United States, 274 U.S. 277, 283 (1927).
87 Jolly v. United States, 170 U.S. 402, 404, 405 (1898).
88 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (1964). "Whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of
piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the
United States, shall be imprisoned for life."
89 1916, 6 & 7 Geo., c. 50.
90 Ibid.
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term "oceanographic station" must be substituted for the term "vessel."
Second, a provision must be included to cover the possibility of theft
of the entire station, which is a real possibility in the case of the
smaller oceanographic stations. With these minor additions, this statute
will provide an adequate basis for the determination of liability in the
case of theft of equipment or information in, or parts of, an oceano-
graphic station, or of the entire station itself.
Title 18 of the United States Code provides two sections, which
may be acceptable either separately or together.
Section 66191 deals with the theft of any personal property occur-
ring within the maritime jurisdiction of the United States:
Whoever, within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of
the United States, takes and carries away, with intent to steal or
purloin, any personal property of another shall be punished as
follows:
If the property taken is of a value exceeding $100, or is taken
from the person of another, by a fine of not more than $5,000, or
imprisonment for not more than five years, or both; in all other
cases, by a fine of not more than $1,000 or by imprisonment not
more than one year, or both.
"Special maritime and territorial jurisdiction" is defined by statute
to include, inter alia, the high seas, and all other water within the mari-
time and admiralty jurisdiction of the United States.9 2
Under section 661, no distinction need be made as to whether the
station is a vessel, an aid to navigation, an extension of land, or a
marine object. Further, no problem will arise as to whether goods taken
are a part of the station, or merely equipment therein. The term
"personal property" is broad enough to cover all objects, including the
station itself, which are placed in the seas. The choice between section
661 of Title 18, United States Code, and section 15 of the Larceny Act
will turn upon the desirability of an extensive enumeration of the
subject matter of the theft, as in the Larceny Act, or a cover-all phrase
such as "personal property," and the desirability of the remedy pro-
vided by each.
The second proposed statute contained in Titie 18 is section 2276.
The text of this section is as follows:
Whoever, upon the high seas or on any other waters within the ad-
miralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, and out
of the jurisdiction of any particular state, breaks or enters any
vessel with intent to commit any felony, or maliciously cuts, spoils,
or destroys any cordage, cable, buoys, buoy rope, head fast, or other
91 18 U.S.C. § 661 (1964).
92 18 US.C. § 7 (1964).
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fast, fixed to the anchor or moorings belonging to any vessel, shall
be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.9 3
This statute is partially directed at theft, and other felonies, and
partially directed at malicious destruction. Further, it is limited to
vessels, which again presents a definitional problem. As worded, this
statute would be comparatively ineffective and undesirable as a basis
for either the malicious destruction or theft section of the proposed
international convention.
Either section 15 of the Larceny Act or section 661 of Title 18 will
provide adequate protection of the stations against theft. Similarly,
section 48 of the Malicious Damage Act will provide adequate protec-
tion against intentional destruction if the drafters of the convention
wish to treat intentional destruction as a separate problem.
C. Salvage
At the outset, it must be determined whether it is desirable to
apply salvage rules to the oceanographic stations. It would appear that
to be consistent with the protectionist policy set out above, it would be
most desirable to provide for the salvage of stations in danger of
damage or destruction from the sea. However, the IOC has voiced
concern that the application of the salvage rules to the stations may
actually foster interference with the stations through "feigned" salvage
operations.94 The objection has merit. Vessels in distress have
witnesses to vouch for the need for the salvors aid; and cargo, vessel
equipment and similar objects usually lack witnesses, but are found
in the sea only when they have been jettisoned or have been torn from
the ship by the elements of the sea. But the bulk of the buoys, aids to
navigation, and ocean stations axe deliberately designed to be placed in
the ocean at a particular place and left unattended for long periods of
time. Under such circumstances a feigned salvage operation could be
conducted with ease.
The decision whether or not to apply salvage rules involves weigh-
ing the danger of feigned salvage against the possibility of refusal, or
lack of inducement, to salvage a station if it should in fact be placed in
peril. Against the objection voiced by the IOC must be weighed the
desire to protect both valuable equipment and information from
damage and destruction in the sea. A careful consideration of two
factors supports application of the salvage rules: First, the burden of
proof of all the elements of a salvage claim is on the salvor. In a feigned
93 1S U.S.C. § 2276 (1964).
94 UNESCO, op. cit. supra, note 8, at 18.
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salvage operation, the element of peril will be absent. 5 To prove this
element, the would-be salvor must overcome evidence that the station
was solidly moored, weather factors were not adverse, and the pre-
sumption that the station was not in peril. Second, the value of the
station and the equipment and information contained therein demands
the assurance of rescue that the salvage rules provide. Few will ex-
pend the time and effort as well as risk the elements of the seas and
the chances of delayed shipments if they are informed that no award
will be given them. Without such an inducement, not only will some
interference and loss of information be occasioned (through feigned
salvage), but all the information, equipment and station itself Will be a
total loss. The time and expense of duplication of the lost items far
outweighs the risk of pretended salvage.
Assuming that the decision is to apply salvage rules, it is suggested
that the salvage system as formulated by English and American mari-
time case opinions be adopted. To the knowledge of this writer, there
is very little pertinent statutory material in these jurisdicitions which
concerns itself with the subject of salvage. What little material exists
is concerned primarily with the procedure for returning the property
and claiming the awardY0
Generally, three elements are universally recognized as necessary
in order that there be a valid salvage claim. There must be: (1) a
marine peril; (2) a rescue service which was voluntarily rendered, i.e.,
the service was not required by a pre-existing duty or a contract; and
(3) partial or complete success in the rescue operation (or that the
service contributed to such success).9
Once the property has been recovered from the peril of the seas,
a lien arises against the owner of the property and in favor of the
salvorY8 The amount of the lien is the amount of the reward due the
salvor for his successful salvage operation. The reward is not merely
95 Ibid.
90 See 1 Stat. 255 (1792), 46 U.S.C. § 721 (1964):
Counsuls and vice counsuls, in cases where vessels of the United States are
stranded on the coasts of their consulates respectively, shall, as far as the
laws of the country will permit, take proper measures, as well for the purpose of
saving the vessels, their cargoes and appurtenances, as for storing and securing
the effects and merchandise saves, and for taking inventories thereof; and the
merchandise and effects saves, with the inventories thereof so taken, shall,
after deducting therefrom tje expenses, be delivered to the owners. No counsul
or vice counsul shall have authority to take possession of any such merchandise,
or other property, when the master, owner, or consignee thereof is present or
capable of taking possession of the same.
97 The Sabine, 101 US. 384 (1879).
98 Cope v. Vallette Dry Dock Co., 119 U.S. 625, 628 (1887).
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"quantum meruit or renumeration pro opere et labore,"I9 9 but an
amount in excess of the value of the services rendered which will serve
as an inducement to mariners to voluntarily salvage property.100
It is interesting to note that courts, especially English courts, have
refused to extend salvage law to objects such as buoys. The case of
Wells v. The Gas Float Whitton No. 2101 involved a floating gas buoy
which was anchored to the sea floor. The buoy in question greatly
resembled some of the ocean stations: it was 50 feet long, 20 feet
wide, and resembled a vessel. The buoy broke loose from its moor-
ings during a gale, and the plaintiff rescued it from the sea. 02 The
following excerpt from the Wells opinion is indicative of English law on
the subject to date:
That a ship or vessel, with her apparel and cargo, and flotsam,
jetsam, and logan which have formed part of one or the other of
these, are subjects of salvage, is clear law... the float could not be
regarded as a ship or a vessel .... It was not constructed for the pur-
pose of being navigated or of conveying cargo or passengers. It was,
in truth, a lighted buoy or beacon. The suggestion that the gas
stored in the float can be regarded as cargo carried by it is more
ingenious than sound. It was, however, argued that, even if the float
be not a ship or a vessel, the award of salvage can, nevertheless, be
supported, inasmuch as the Admiralty Court has jurisdiction to
award salvage in respect of every object, no matter what, which,
being in peril at sea.., has been saved from that peril. Not a single
decision, not even a dictum, of any English judge was cited to your
Lordships as an authority for this wide view of admiralty jurisdic-
tion. And it does not obtain any substantial support from the works
of lawyers of recognised authority, who have refined what is meant
by "salvage" in maritime law. ...o3
Perhaps the court's reason for refusing to extend salvage rules to
buoys was a fear similar to that voiced by the IOC, although they gave
the conventional basis for their holding in the opinion.
Courts in the United States also narrowly applied salvage rules 04
until recently when the test of salvageability was judicially changed
from one of subject matter to one of locality:
The test as to what is the subject of salvage is no longer,
whether it is a vessel engaged in commerce or its cargo or furniture,
but whether the thing saved is a movable thing, possessing the
99 The Sabine, supra note 97.
100 Ibid.
101 76 L.T. (ns.) 663 (H.L. 1897).
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid., p. 665.
104 Cope v. Vallette Dry Dock Co., supra note 98, at 629; Maltby v. Steam Derrick
Boat, 16 Fed. Cas. 564 (No. 9,000) (E.D. Va., 1879).
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attributes of property, susceptible of being lost and saved in places
within the local jurisdiction of the admiralty.105
It is likely that under this test, the stations would be a proper
subject of salvage. But here again, if it is decided that the protection
afforded by the Anglo-American system of salvage law is desired, it is
not necessary to wrestle with the problem of its past application. If the
law's protection is desirable, all that need be urged is its adoption by
the signatories for future application.
V. JURIDICTION
Whenever a controversy involving an ocean station occurs, there
are likely to be conflicting claims of jurisdiction to determine the rights
and liabilities of the parties involved. The state of the injured party
will claim jurisdiction in order to insure that the damage is redressed;
the state of the guilty party will assert its right to determine the cause
to guarantee that the issues are fairly decided. The means of resolving
this question is through a convention which will provide for (1) the
exchange of jurisdictional powers among the signatory states or (2)
vest all jurisdiction in an international body, such as the IMOC, which
will adjudicate the claims.
A state can only yield as much jurisdiction as it has; thus, the
breadth of existing jurisdiction of the states must be examined. The
United States0 ' and England'0 7 assert jurisdiction over admiralty
claims wherever they arise, notwithstanding the fact that the parties to
the controversies are not domiciles or citizens of the respective states.
In practice, both nations have determined claims arising in navi-
gable waters everywhere. They have effectively adjudicated claims
arising from a collision between two domestic ships in foreign waters,10
between two foreign ships which collided in foreign territorial waters,10
and two foreign ships which collided on the high seas." 0 Jurisdiction
105 Broere v. Two Thousand One Hundred Thirty-Three Dollars, 72 F. Supp. 115,
118 (E.D.N.Y. 1947). See also Colby v. Todd Packing Co., 80 F. Supp. 761 (D.C. Alaska,
1948).
108 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1964).
107 Administration of Justice Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 46. Admiralty shall have
jurisdiction to determine claims of damage done by or to a ship, wherever arising, whether
or not the parties to the controversies are British.
108 The Diana, 539 Lush 243, 167 Eng. Rep. 243 (Adm. 1862).
109 The Courier, 541 Lush. 239, 167 Eng. Rep. 244 (Adm. 1862), involving a
collision between two foreign ships in foreign waters.
110 The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355 (1885), involving a collision on the high seas
between a Belgian and a Norwegian ship.
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has also been asserted over crimes committed on board domestic ships
located in foreign territorial waters.11'
Most significantly, they have asserted jurisdiction to adjudicate
claims arising from damage done by or to an aid to navigation, notwith-
standing the location of the object. The justification for asserting such
jurisdiction is that such damage, occurring in navigable waters, is a
maritime tort, and admiralty courts have always had jurisdiction over
a cause of action arising in navigable waters.1 2 The test for jurisdiction
is the locality of the act."'
The Blackheath"14 opinion presents the classical justification for
assertion of jurisdiction over damage done by or to aids to navigation.
There a ship collided with a beacon which was mounted on piles in
the Middle of the Mobile River. The court, in answering the allegation
that admiralty lacked jurisdiction to try the case, said:
It is enough to say that we now are dealing with an injury to a
government aid to navigation from ancient times subject to the
admiralty, a beacon emerging from the water, injured by the motion
of the vessel, by a continuous act beginning and consummated upon
navigable water, and giving character to the effect upon a point
which is only technically land, through a connection at the bottom
of the sea. In such a case, jurisdiction may be taken without tran-
scending the limits of the Constitution... 1r,
The case of The Tolten"8 involved damage done by a ship to a
wharf in foreign waters. The court found that it had to adjudicate the
in rem suit by reason of its general jurisdiction over torts occurring in
navigable waters." 7 An identical decision was rendered in The Rait-
moor,118 which involved a collision of a ship with a beacon. And again
in The Mackinaw,"9 the court found that it had jurisdiction. Tke
Mackinaw is particularly important since it concerned damage done to
a floating, moored pontoon, an object quite similar in construction to
the ocean stations.2
Ill United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137 (1933). Murder of an American citizen
by another American citizen aboard an American vessel in a port in the Belgian Congo.
See also 18 U.S.C. § 7 (1964), United States v. Dixon, 73 F. Supp. 683 (E.D.N.Y. 1947),
where defendant was an alien.
112 Atlantic Transport Co. of West Virginia v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52 (1914).
113 Ibid.
114 195 U.S. 361 (1904).
115 Id. at 367.
116 [1946J 2 All E.R. 372 Adm.
117 Ibid.
118 241 U.S. 166 (1916).
119 165 Fed. 351 (1908).
120 Ibid.
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It is apparent that at least in theory states will have jurisdiction
over the acts wherever they may occur, and the jurisdiction will be
concurrent. The result may be that one incident will give rise to prob-
lems of multiple suits in different jurisdictions, res judicata, and recog-
nition and effect of foreign judgments.
While an inchoate lien arises against the offending object at the
moment of damage,121 an admiralty court must obtain in rem jurisdic-
tion over the offender before the lien can be perfected, and the damages
paid. 2 Admiralty must have physical possession of the vessel before
the suit can be determined, i.e., the vessel must be subjected to the
jurisdiction of the court by arrest. 23 If the damage occurs outside of
the territorial limits of the state, the court may not be able to assert its
jurisdiction if the offender refrains from entering the venue of the
court. This fact substantially limits the jurisdiction of admiralty.
To avoid conflicts over jurisdiction,24 to expand the practical
limits of the adjudicating body's effectiveness, and to otherwise imple-
ment the proposed substantive system set out above, some provision
must be made in the convention concerning jurisdiction. 12' Two al-
ternatives are available: first, an exchange of jurisdiction among sig-
natories to the convention. Each signatory will vest in all other
signatories all the maritime jurisdiction it now possesses or claims to
possess for the sole purpose of adjudicating claims relating to the
ocean stations. The injured party may bring suit in the courts of any
signatory state, which will determine the claim according to the system
outlined above. The judgment will be executed by the signatory state
which is the domicile or residence of the guilty party, or if no signatory
state be the domicile or residence of the offender, then the signatory
state which first asserts physical power over the property or person of
the guilty party. The second alternative is to place all jurisdiction in
one body, such as the IOC. All signatory states would vest all the
maritime jurisdiction they possess or claim to possess in one supreme
judicature for the sole purpose of determining claims relating to the
stations. No signatory would possess any power to determine the claim,
but each will retain the power to attach the purported offender's person
or property during the period that the claim is being decided, and to
121 The China, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 53 (1868).
122 Harmer v. Bell, 7 Moore 267, 13 Eng. Rep. 884 (P.C. 1851).
123 The Philomena, 200 Fed. 859 (D. Mass. 1911).
124 See The Case of the S.S. Lotus, P.CJ.J. Ser. A, No. 10 (1927).
125 See: International Convention on Certain Rules Concerning Civil Jurisdiction in
Matters of Collision, and International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to Penal jurisdiction in Matters of Collisions or Other Incidents of Navigation,
Benedict, Admiralty, 35-48 (Knauths ed. 1958).
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execute the claim, if necessary. The power to attach and execute upon
the offender will be based, as above, upon domicile, residence, or asser-
tion of physical power over the offender. Alternative number one offers
an array of convenient forums to the injured party, but lacks the ad-
vantage of uniform application of the law and a safeguard against
multiple suits. Alternative number two presents the possible problem of
an inconvenient forum, but assures uniform application of law, an im-
partial court, and an extensive and effective execution of judgments.
Each alternative contains attractive features not found in the
other. Regardless of which is selected, one of these suggestions, or a
similar proposal, should be embodied in the convention in order to
achieve adequate protection for the stations. The finest substantive
provisions will be meaningless if the accompanying jurisdictional provi-
sions are, for all practical purposes, unworkable.
CONCLUSION
Information gained through employment of research stations will
benefit all other ocean-orientated activities; and since all ocean inter-
ests will share in the productivity of oceanographic stations, it follows
that all these interests should yield a portion of their virtually unre-
stricted use of the seas in order that the research stations may carry
on their work undisturbed.
Executing a protectionist policy, then, should be a foremost con-
sideration in the selection or formulation of a system of law by which
to determine the rights and liabilities of parties involved in collision,
theft and salvage claims centering around the stations. Provisions con-
cerning liability in the event of collision between the stations and other
ocean craft should be weighted in favor of the station owners. The
remedies afforded by these provisions should not only compensate
station owners for damages sustained, but also provide remedies which
will deter collision in the first instance. This will require penalties in
excess of those now provided in the event of collision between con-
ventional ocean craft.
Similarly, provisions concerning intentional damage or destruction
and theft should also provide strong deterrents. In those instances
where a malicious act is committed, the remedy should be sufficient
to compensate the station owner for his loss.
The protectionist policy requires more than providing for deter-
rence of, and compensation for collision, intentional destruction, and
theft. It also requires an inducement to other ocean operators to volun-
tarily protect the stations from damage and destruction at the hands of
nature or as a result of peril due to the acts of third parties. For this
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reason, provision should be made in the convention for a system of
rewards for salvors which is as attractive as that now provided for
salvors of conventional vessels and marine objects.
Finally, in order to guarantee the effectiveness of the substantive
law scheme, provision should also be made in the convention concerning
jurisdiction to adjudicate claims. While in theory many states assert
broad jurisdiction to adjudicate maritime claims, the practical applica-
tion of this power has been somewhat less than orderly. Further, in
order to give practical effect to the protection provided by the substan-
tive portion of the convention, some guarantee must be made that not
only will the litigants have easy access to a forum and uniform applica-
tion of law, but also that the judgments rendered will be enforced. This
result can only come from a provision clearly outlining the jurisdiction
of the signatory states or of an international judiciary, as the case may
be, and the process whereby judgments may be executed.
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